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IRONIES IN THE CITY:
REFLECTIONS ON STEVEN SMITH’S
PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY
PERRY DANE†
INTRODUCTION
Much of Steven Smith’s new book, Pagans and Christians in
the City1, is compelling, even lyrical. His account of the religious
sensibility2 is powerful and convincing. Smith’s book is also more
nuanced and hedged-about in its historical and theoretical claims
than one would suppose from a headline account that would focus
only on his two chapters near the end3 that drill down on
contemporary issues in the so-called culture wars.
As a religious believer,4 I share some of Smith’s concerns
with the most arrogant expressions of contemporary secularism,
though I also happen to be a strict separationist in the American
constitutional context.5 And as a believer in fundamental human
rights, I worry about how long a godless world would be able to
sustain a set of commitments ultimately rooted in the sheer fact
that human beings were created in the image of God.6
Nevertheless, some deep ironies and puzzles run through the
text of Pagans and Christians. Smith is too careful and subtle to
ignore these undercurrents entirely. But it will be worth
bringing them to the surface, not only for their own sake but
because they might help suggest an alternative to Smith’s most
rough-edged claims. My aim in this essay is not merely to nitpick. Any work as magisterial as Smith’s book will generalize
and elide along the way. But I do hope by the accumulation of
details to suggest a fundamental worry that goes to the most
Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School.
STEPHEN D. SMITH, PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY: CULTURE WARS
FROM THE TIBER TO THE POTOMAC (2018) [hereinafter PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS].
2
See generally id. at ch. 2.
3
See generally id. at ch. 10–11.
4
See Perry Dane, Judaism, Pluralism, and Constitutional Glare, 16 RUTGERS J.
L. & RELIGION 282 (2015).
5
See Perry Dane, Establishment and Encounter, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
LAW AND RELIGION 125–53 (2018).
6
See NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS (2008).
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charged words and phrases at the heart of the book’s title—
“pagans” and “culture wars.”
I.

TRANSCENDENT PAGANS, IMMANENT
CHRISTIANS, . . . AND JEWS

The first irony is theological. Smith relies for much of his
argument on the sharp distinction he wants to draw between
paganism—in both its classical Roman and modern secularist
forms—and Christianity. To be sure, these three phenomena are
radically different from each other. But Smith’s recurring focus
on pagan “immanence” and Christian “transcendence” does not
adequately capture those differences.
A.

Divinity

“Transcendence” means at least three things for Smith. For
one, he argues that while the pagan Gods were beings in the
world, the Christian God is ultimately beyond the world. This
sharp dichotomy does not do justice to the important
philosophical expressions of Greek and Roman religious thought,
not the least of which was Aristotle’s conception—deeply
influential on later Jewish and Christian thought—of God as
prime cause and unmoved mover. More to the point, perhaps,
some later Roman thinkers in that Hellenistic tradition
understood the various gods of the pantheon, and the gods of
other pantheons, as expressing in cognizable terms the deeper,
infinite and ineffable reality of the transcendent God. The
Roman author Sallust, for example, argued that the ultimate God
was unchanging, eternal, incorporeal, and incomprehensible.
That highest God, or first cause, was transcendence itself—
“essentially distinct . . . from the multitude of gods which he
ineffably comprehends.”7
Conversely, Smith’s account minimizes the central claim of
Christian faith—the incarnation of the third person of the Trinity
as Jesus Christ, who was wholly God and wholly man. As Rowan
Williams, the retired Archbishop of Canterbury has put it,
Christians are “enabled to speak of God as God is (not merely as
God is not, as the inaccessible Other) because of what is made
actual in the fleshly reality of Jesus, the divine act which
establishes the community of thanksgiving and service speaking

7
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God’s praise and addressing God as Abba.”8 The incarnational
dimension of Christianity is not a mere add-on to a more purely
transcendent faith; it goes “all the way down.”9
Ironically, traditional Jewish thought long treated
Christianity as akin to paganism because of its core
incarnational and Trinitarian commitments. That charge was
unfair, but not entirely silly. In any event, Judaism in its own
way has also always emphasized the important tension between
the transcendent and immanent faces of God—the Godhead the
loving Father, the ultimate reality and the spirit of the Shekinah
that goes into exile with her people. Indeed, if one were to look
for a truly absolute, uncompromised, account of the transcendent
God, it would have to be in the more recent deist notion of a God
who sets creation in motion and leaves it at that. By the
measure of such entirely abstracted notions of God, paganism,
Judaism, Christianity all seem more alike than different from
each other.
B. Goods
“Transcendence” for Smith also refers to a concern for
transcendent goods, including eternal life, in contrast to
paganism’s efforts to sacralize the goods of this world.10 Here,
interestingly, though, it is Judaism that immediately looks more
“pagan” by Smith’s lights. Consider only Rabbi Joseph B.

ROWAN WILLIAMS, CHRIST THE HEART OF CREATION: THE TENSION AND
METAPHYSICS OF THEOLOGY 241–42 (2018). Elsewhere in the same book,
commenting on an essay by Erich Przywara, Archbishop Williams argues that:
Consciously echoing Augustine, Przywara insists that union with the
immaterial and transcendent God can only occur in union with the
suffering, struggling, compromised body/Body on earth, living out God’s
descent into the depths.45 Thus what he has to say about method in
metaphysics is paralleled by a prescription for theology: authentic theology
shows itself, in self-forgetting and self-dispossessing practice. The theology
that we write and discuss has no substance independently of this formal
content, this knowledge of how to ‘enact Christ’ in the world.
Id. at 248. See also STANLEY HAUERWAS, WORKING WITH WORDS: ON LEARNING TO
SPEAK CHRISTIAN 175 (2011) (“For Christians, immanence first and foremost names
that God became man that we might participate in the very life of God. So nothing
can be more immanent than God with us. Transcendence, moreover, is . . . the other
side of God’s immanence.”).
9
Perry Dane, Paths and Wrong Turns in the Jewish-Christian Encounter,
(unpublished paper) presented at “Fulfilling the Promise of a New Relationship: An
Academic Roundtable on Christian-Jewish Relations,” (January 7, 2019) (on file with
the author).
10
PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 1, at 211.
8
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Soloveitchik’s brilliant account in Halakhic Man,11 in which he
emphasizes the central Jewish commitment to discovering the
legally precise sacred meaning in everything that is quotidian—
food, drink, the sunrise, the seasons, walls and parapets, torts,
and contracts. Nor should we overlook Christianity’s own
materiality, expressed not only through sacramental theology but
most vividly in the obsession in the middle ages—that most
Christian of eras—with relics and pilgrimages.12 More centrally,
though, Smith pays too little attention to early Christianity’s
defining decision to reject both the Marcionite claim that the
Creator God of the Hebrew Bible was a mere evil demiurge and
Gnostic efforts to treat the material world as irreparably vile in
its materiality.
C. Truth
Finally, Smith suggests that Christianity is “transcendent”
in its commitment to absolute, objective, truth. Concededly,
Christianity has almost from its start focused on credal
commitments in contrast to the “pagan” interest in correct
practice. Again, though, Judaism is the test case that undoes
this simple dichotomy. Judaism, like Smith’s paganism, is
concerned with practice more than creed.
It also has a
complicated view of propositional commitments, as the famous
story of the Oven of Akhnai demonstrates, with its account of
God rejoicing in the rabbinic elevation of human majority rule
over heavenly DECLARATION of the Truth.13 And ask even a very
traditional Jew whether he or she “believes” the Midrash and
Aggadah, and one is likely to get an answer that suspiciously
resembles some “pagan” responses to whether they “believe” in
the gods. The same might be said, for that matter, of Hindu
responses to whether they “believe” in their own multiplicity of
divinities. The point is not that these traditions reject the search
for Truth, but rather that they deeply appreciate the prismatic
complexity of Truth.
The Christian story, understood in all its breadth, actually
shares that same appreciation. For underneath the admitted
commitment to propositional, credal, articulation, there have
always been profound contrary traces, from the Emperor
JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, HALAKHIC MAN (1984).
See JONATHAN SUMPTION, THE AGE OF PILGRIMAGE: THE MEDIEVAL JOURNEY
TO GOD (1975).
13
B. Talmud, Bava Metzia 59a-b.
11
12
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Constantine’s complaints about, as Smith puts it, “intricate
theological disputations”14 to the Eastern Orthodox emphasis on
non-propositional mysteries15 to Meister Eckhart’s mystical
recognition of the “nothingness of God”16 to contemporary
Christians’ focus, in both evangelical circles and the attitude of
the current Pope, on the centrality of an existential encounter
with Jesus over and above any formulaic abstractions.
Meanwhile, confidence in transcendent truth often appears
in full force on the other side of the dichotomies that Smith
wants to construct. Classical Greek and Roman thought—not all
of it, but enough—was as committed to Truth as any credal
Christian. Just think of Plato or Aristotle or Seneca. And while
our contemporary age is plagued by an overabundance of cheap,
unreflective, skepticism and relativism, many of the most
thoughtful articulators of secular thought are fully committed to
the search for Truth. Secular moral philosophers, for example,
continue to debate the claims of moral realism,17 but most come
down in favor, happily committing themselves to that and other
immaterial truths even in what might be a godless world. Smith
himself discusses at some length the legacy of Ronald Dworkin.
He does not find Dworkin’s account of godless moral realism
convincing, but that is not really to the point. These questions
are hard, and the religious effort to combine a belief in absolute
moral truths with belief in a God who commands is at least
equally difficult to sustain, as Plato most famously recognized in
the Euthyphro.18
D. Frames
So why does Smith, for all his subtlety and nuance, still stick
to his sharp distinction between the “transcendent” world of
Christians and the “immanent” world of both ancient and modern
pagans? One reason is surely polemical. Hard lines make for
severer critiques. In this connection, it is telling that Smith
PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 1, at 167.
See KALLISTOS WARE, THE ORTHODOX WAY (rev. ed., St. Vladimir’s Seminary
Press 1995) (1979).
16
See Bernard McGinn, Hidden God and Hidden Self: the emergence of
apophatic anthropology in Christian mysticism, in HISTORIES OF THE HIDDEN GOD:
CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION IN GNOSTIC, ESOTERIC, AND MYSTICAL TRADITIONS
87, 96–98 (April D. DeConick & Grant Adamson, eds., Routledge 2014) (2013).
17
See GILBERT HARMAN & JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, MORAL RELATIVISM AND
MORAL OBJECTIVITY (1996).
18
PLATO, EUTHYPHRO (Benjamin Jowett, trans., 1871).
14
15
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refers often to the work of Jan Assmann, who employed the
immanent-transcendent distinction to serve even more polemical
ends, though Assmann (ironically enough?) argued that Western
religion had turned violent and oppressive precisely because it
took up a “transcendent” view of God and truth.19
A more interesting possibility is that Smith’s thesis reveals
his own embeddedness in the metaphysical assumptions of
modernity. Charles Taylor has famously argued that we the
denizens of modernity (defined in terms of the past several
hundred years) understand reality through an “immanent
frame.”20
The physical world of that immanent frame is
disenchanted, material, and explainable by science. Similarly,
our social world is marked by the passage of secular time and the
valorization of instrumental rationality. This modern immanent
frame does not exclude the possibility of religion and religious
faith, though it does render such faith eminently contestable.
More to the current point, even religious believers in modernity
understand the world by way of the immanent frame so that if a
divine reality does exist, it must create the world and impinge on
its affairs from the outside, to so speak. The everyday world
defined by the immanent frame “constitutes a ‘natural’ order, to
be contrasted with a supernatural one, an ‘immanent’ world over
against a possible ‘transcendent’ one.”21 To put it another way,
Smith’s singular focus (and ours) on the polarity of “immanence”
and “transcendence” might be at least in part an artifact of his
(and our) distinctly modern experience of both.
To see this point more clearly, imagine for a moment a
metaphysic defined by a “transcendent frame.” From within that
radically different frame, “immanence is saturated with
transcendence.”22 The fundamental question is not how God
could exist in the face of a causally self-sufficient material world,
See, e.g., JAN ASSMANN, THE PRICE OF MONOTHEISM (Robert Savage, trans.,
Stanford University Press 2009) (2003). To be sure, it is entirely consistent for Smith
to borrow from Assmann’s picture of a fundamental distinction between immanent
and transcendent religions while disagreeing with Assmann’s critique of
transcendent religions. But it is still awkward.
20
CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 542 (2007). For a helpful and illuminating
introduction to Taylor’s thesis and its implications, see JAMES K. A. SMITH, HOW
(NOT) TO BE SECULAR: READING CHARLES TAYLOR (2014).
21
TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 542.
22
Alexander J. B. Hampton, Transcendence and Immanence: Deciphering Their
Relation through the Transcendentals in Aquinas and Kant, 34 TORONTO J.
THEOLOGY 187 (2018) reproduced in Advance Online version on Project MUSE, at 8,
muse.jhu.edu/article/707948. See also id. at 7.
19
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but instead how the material world—the world of creation—could
exist in the shadow of an infinite, all-encompassing, divine
reality that might seem to exclude anything else.
Thomas Aquinas and other Western medieval philosophers
tackled this problem by positing notions of transcendence and
immanence, and the relationship between the two, deeply at odds
with the modern mindset. As one scholar has put it:
Aquinas maintains that “deus est omnia ut causa omnium”
(“God is everything as the cause of everything”). Consequently,
God cannot be understood as something transcendent over and
against immanent creation. Rather, as the cause of everything,
God is radically transcendent, distinguished from everything as
the First Being (primum ens) and not dependent upon any prior
cause for existence as “Being itself” (ipsum esse per se
subsistens). At the same time, also as the cause of everything,
God is also immanent, since all creatures participate in God,
who determines their natures. It is through this immanence
that we come to know transcendence . . . .23

Or consider a different example of a “transcendent frame.”
For the Jewish Kabbalists who developed Lurianic mysticism
and its offshoots, the response to the puzzle of creation in the
face of divine infinitude was a form of kenosis—the idea that the
God who filled the entire span of reality engaged in a voluntary
act of contraction known as tzimtzum to establish a space within
which the world could exist.24 God in this vision does not create
the world or act on it from an external perch, so to speak, but
rather transforms a piece of the divine into the immanent world.
That transformation is always partial and provisional, however,
leading to an exquisite array of gradations, and linkages and
influences running in both directions, between the immanent
world and the transcendent Godhead.
Moreover, in some
interpretations of this mystical and mysterious vision, the
tzimtzum was not an act of contraction at all, but rather of
Id. at 7. Note that the notion of “cause” at work here is not the sort of
mechanical cause posited both by modern science and by contemporary religious
supporters of notions such as “intelligent design,” but a metaphysical cause that
sustains the very possibility of material existence from moment to moment. See
EDWARD FESER, FIVE PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (2017).
For a very different account of the centralty of immanence in any faith that looks
to the self-emptying of both God and human beings, see ALEX DUBILER, THE SELFEMPTYING SUBJECT: KENOSIS AND IMMANENCE, MEDIEVAL TO MODERN (2018).
24
See JOSEPH DAN, GERSHOM SCHOLEM AND THE MYSTICAL DIMENSION OF
JEWISH HISTORY 260–68 (1987); NORMAN LAMM, THE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF
HASIDISM: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 6–7, 40–49 (1999).
23
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concealment.25 It is only from our limited perspective that we
imagine a distinction between the immanent world and the
transcendent God in the first place; from the divine perspective,
which is truth itself, all such categories dissolve.26
All this is admittedly knotty. But the larger takeaways from
this excursion are more straightforward.
To begin with, in aligning certain modern trends with
Roman paganism, Smith elides—even on his own terms—the
vast difference between an ancient belief in immanent gods and a
modern belief in an immanent world. More to the point, in the
larger sweep of history, the most relevant distinction might not
be between “pagans” (both ancient and modern) inhabiting an
impoverished “immanent,” world and Christians committed to a
transcendent God. Instead, following Taylor, the really profound
distinction might be between all pre-modern people (Christians,
Jews, and pagans alike) who saw the divine and the world
through a common transcendent frame and all of us moderns
(Christians, Jews, secularists, and all the rest) who see reality
through an immanent frame—a frame so powerful that we can at
most only bracket it temporarily through an exercise of
sympathetic imagination.
II. PAGAN CHRISTIANS AND CHRISTIAN PAGANS
The first major irony in Pagans and Christians, then, is that
Smith, very much a modern thinker, draws too sharp a
distinction between transcendent and immanent world-views in
their pre-modern forms. The second irony follows from the first,
though it can also be stated independently. In Smith’s grand
historical narrative, Christianity overcame paganism, but
elements of paganism now threaten to reassert themselves in the
guise of contemporary popular culture and legal mischief. Smith
concedes that elements of paganism have always been with us,
even at the height of the Christian dispensation. But he still sees
the two world-views as essentially dichotomous. The irony,
though, is that Christianity did not merely overcome paganism,
it also drew heavily on some of its core intellectual and spiritual
structures, and then Christianity in some sense returned the
See RACHEL ELIOR, THE PARADOXICAL ASCENT TO GOD: THE KABBALISTIC
THEOSOPHY OF HABAD HASIDISM 88–90 (Jeffrey M. Green, trans., 1993); LAMM,
supra note 24, at 45 n.138. See also DAN COHN-SHERBOK, FIFTY KEY JEWISH
THINKERS 35 (1997).
26
See ELIOR, supra note 25, at 88–90; LAMM, supra note 24, at 45 n.138.
25
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favor by nurturing the fundamental ideas out of which
modernity, including the phenomena that Smith identifies as
pagan, was eventually born.
As the historian Paula Fredriksen emphasizes, in the early
years when the Jesus movement that would eventually become
Christianity was in its infancy, Jews and pagans mixed much
more easily, socially and otherwise, than we might think.
Pagans visited synagogues and Jews donated to pagan
institutions. She argues that it was precisely that milieu of
casual contact that allowed and encouraged the Apostle Paul to
begin his outreach to the gentiles, an outreach that eventually
led to the decisive break between Jews and Christians.27 Later,
during the long period when many Jews lived as a subject
minority under Christian rule, they often referred to the
Christian world as Edom (Esau), the same label that they had
attached to pagan Imperial Rome. Even putting such polemics
aside, it is undeniable that the fundamental Christian separation
from Judaism did not merely rest on the Christian absorption
into the structures of the Roman political world or on the
Christian religious commitment to the divinity of Jesus, but most
vitally on its absorption of classical Greek and Roman conceptual
categories and intellectual methodologies as the frame within
which it articulated and understood that commitment. That
synthesis—which includes the credal, propositional, approach to
faith that Smith (in an irony all its own) identifies as distinctly
anti-pagan, has remained in place, though under increasing
challenge, ever since. Indeed, Pope Benedict XVI staked his
theology, and his arguments about a central difference between
Christianity and Islam, on what he argued was the indispensable
“synthesis between the Greek spirit and the Christian spirit.”28
Further along the Western cultural journey, what we now
know as modernity did not spring forth ex nihilo, nor did it
merely represent a resurgence of paganism. To the contrary,
although many secularists would be embarrassed to admit it, the
modern world, including the conditions that allowed the loss of
faith among many moderns, was birthed, or at the least
27
See PAULA FREDRIKSEN, WHEN CHRISTIANS WERE JEWS: THE FIRST
GENERATION (2018).
28
Pope Benedict XVI, Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and
Reflections, Lecture at the University of Regensburg (Sept. 12, 2006), http://w2.va
tican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe
_20060912_university-regensburg.html.

12

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 57:3

midwifed, by Christian ideals. It is by now a historical truism,
for example, that the origins of modern science had a good deal to
do with Jewish and Christian assumptions about the potential
decipherability of a universe brought into being by orderly
creator God.29
Similarly, modern liberalism, with its
assumptions about human nature and human equality, traces
back to the decisive moral revolution that Christians, inspired by
Jews, brought to the West.30 Even the idea of the “secular,”
largely unknown to pagans, was a Christian insight. And more
complex patterns of causation are apparent if we look specifically
at the influence of the Protestant Reformation or for that matter,
if some so-called Radical Orthodox thinkers are to be believed,
the influential but dangerous turn of Duns Scotus in the
thirteenth century to a univocal theology of the relation between
God and the world.31
The larger point here is simple: Smith is very good at
identifying binaries and polarities. But he seems much less
interested in recognizing dialectics and internal tensions.
III. THE LONG IN-BETWEEN
A third irony, which comes closer to the headline piece of
Smith’s more extended argument: Although Smith devotes
proportionally fewer pages to the long period of Christendom
between the conversion of Constantine and the rise of secular
liberal states, one might get the impression that he views that
period, even with all its faults (absolutism, Crusades, wars,
persecution of Jews, heretics, and dissidents, and so on) as in
some respects at least a blessed age, free of the worst influences
of the pagan temptation. Yet many serious, devout, Christians
have long considered the Constantinian turn to be Christianity’s
gravest historical error and the release from the official grip of
Christendom to be Christianity’s best hope for the future.32 (Note
that the end of Christendom, though related in complicated ways
29
See, e.g., REIJER HOOYKAAS, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF MODERN SCIENCE
(1972); JOHN HEDLEY BROOKE, SCIENCE AND RELIGION: SOME HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES (1991).
30
See, e.g., LARRY SIEDENTOP, INVENTING THE INDIVIDUAL: THE ORIGINS OF
WESTERN LIBERALISM (2014).
31
See JOHN MILBANK, THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY BEYOND SECULAR
REASON xxiv–xxvi (2006); Catherine Pickstock, Duns Scotus: His Historical and
Contemporary Significance, 21 MOD. THEOLOGY 543 (2005).
32
To my mind, the canonical work on this theme is STANLEY HAUERWAS, AFTER
CHRISTENDOM (1991).
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to the birth of Taylor’s “secular age,” is conceptually distinct from
it.33)
This vision of an emancipated Christianity without
Christendom was surely the hope, for example, of Roger
Williams.
Similarly, James Madison, in his famous
Remonstrance, argued that “During almost fifteen centuries has
the legal establishment of Christianity been on trial. What have
been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride and indolence in
the Clergy, ignorance and servility in the laity, in both,
superstition, bigotry and persecution.”34 Today, many thoughtful
Christians celebrate not only the official end of Christian political
establishment, but also the end of the historic era in which the
culture valorized Christianity while Christianity served as a
meek apologist for the culture’s failure to live up to genuine
Christian ideals.35 These Christians do not renounce any effort
to influence the larger culture. But they insist on maintaining a
prophetic voice, critical distance, and a certain necessary
alienation that was too often impossible during the long episode
of Christian hegemony.36
IV. GRAND NARRATIVES AND LEGAL CONUNDRUMS
Finally, there’s an irony apparent in those headline two
chapters in which Smith most directly sets his sights on what he
considers to be the rise of a new paganism. The irony is simple:
In coming near the end of his large-scale, even magisterial,
survey of paganism and Christianity, with powerful asides on the
texture of religious thought, Smith ends up focusing on a series of
contemporary questions that seem profoundly small-bore by
comparison and whose treatment in Smith’s hands is often
incomplete.

33
For one thing, official Christendom persisted in some places even into
modernity. For another, modern secularity has had deep cultural and religious
consequences outside the historic strongholds of Latin Christendom. See MIRJAM
KÜNKLER, JOHN MADELEY, & SHYLASHRI SHANKAR, A SECULAR AGE BEYOND THE
WEST: RELIGION, LAW, AND THE STATE IN ASIA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND NORTH
AFRICA (2018).
34
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
June 20, 1785, in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 29, 32 (Jack N. Rakove, ed., 1999).
35
See, e.g., STANLEY HAUERWAS & WILLIAM H. WILLIMON, RESIDENT ALIENS:
LIFE IN THE CHRISTIAN COLONY (1989).
36
See also MIROSLAV VOLF, PUBLIC FAITH: HOW FOLLOWERS OF CHRIST SHOULD
SERVE THE COMMON GOOD (2011). The demise of political Christendom is surely
related to the birth of Taylor’s “immanent frame,” though I will not try here to begin
to trace the subtleties of those connections.
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What I’m calling the “small-bore” dimension of Smith’s
critique has several layers. First, Smith dates the rise of what he
thinks is a new paganism, not to the past several hundred years
of modernity or even the past hundred years, but to the latter
part of the twentieth century.37 Second, he zooms in on the
United States even though the cultural developments he’s
describing should in principle be much more sweeping. Third,
even within that ambit, Smith focuses on a set of questions that
have been at or near the fore of the so-called American “culture
wars” between left and right.
Some of this is understandable. Smith is a distinguished law
professor, and despite the large-scale ambitions of the book, he
might be forgiven for returning to a set of questions that have
occupied American political and constitutional debate. But in
doing so, he risks overlooking relevant comparisons and
complexities. For example, if some of us were being asked to
identity sites of resurgent “paganism” in the current historic age,
we might point first of all to Nazi Germany,38 other totalitarian
states, and their offshoots in various white supremacist and
other contemporary radical hate groups.39 He also deploys
himself on one side of what have become embarrassingly
polarized controversies that sometimes seem to be as much about
mustering political identities as staking principled positions, let
alone seeking common ground.
To get more specific on a few of Smith’s concerns in the last
part of Pagans and Christians:
A.

The Public Square

Smith warns about the elimination of public religious
displays and a Christian-tinged civic religion in American public
life. But he pays short shrift to the religious separationist
impulse, to which I have alluded, that opposes such symbols
precisely because they threaten to trivialize and even degrade

PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 1, at 259.
Susannah Heschel has argued that Nazi ideology was more entangled with
certain perverse expressions of Christianity than with modern neo-paganism,
SUSANNAH HESCHEL ,THE ARYAN JESUS: CHRISTIAN THEOLOGIANS AND THE BIBLE
IN NAZI GERMANY 1–3, 195 (2008). But be that as it may, the form of that the Nazis
espoused was by any description a paganized Christianity.
39
See MATTIAS GARDELL, GODS OF THE BLOOD: THE PAGAN REVIVAL AND WHITE
SEPARATISM (2003).
37
38
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religion.40 He also never quite makes the case that the battle
over religious symbols is part of a genuinely consequential war
between Christianity and a resurgent paganism. For one thing,
countries that have kept their public religious symbols and
practices, including Britain with its English religious
establishment, are in most respects more secular, and even more
“pagan,” than the United States. And for another, it is precisely
with respect to the increasingly tiresome fights over crosses,
creches, and the like that the American battlefront often seems
to involve (sometimes on both sides) a purely tribal politics with
little of substance undergirding it.
B. Sex
Smith also points to battles over sex and a resurgent “pagan”
sensibility of untrammeled sexual gratification.
Sex is
significant, as is its relationship to broader forces in human
history and culture. There is also something to regret in our
contemporary morality of sex. But there was also a good deal to
regret in the sexual morality of other periods, including during
the heyday of Christendom.41 It is simply hard for any culture to
get sex right, and I’m not sure that any culture has.
Smith also overplays the idea that contemporary sexual
excesses reflect a quintessentially “pagan” view. For one thing,
Roman paganism did not lack a sexual morality of its own and on
its own terms.42 For another, it is hard to sustain the thesis that
a loosening of sexual norms stems directly from an immanent or
“pagan” metaphysics in the face of the tendency of the most
“godless” totalitarian regimes of recent times to also be deeply
traditional, even puritanical, in their effort to control the sexual
practices of their citizens.43 Moreover, there is at least one vital
respect in which the modern sexual culture that Smith describes
wears its Christian influences in a way that might entirely
confound Roman pagans, and that is its affirmation—in principle
if not necessarily in practice—that the same basic sexual norms
See Perry Dane, Prayer is Serious Business: Reflections on Town of Greece, 15
RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 611 (2014); Perry Dane, Separation Anxiety, 22 J. L. &
RELIGION 545 (2007) (reviewing NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S
CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT (2005)).
41
A more complete discussion would also need to consider the complex history
and theology of Jewish sexual norms.
42
See REBECCA LANGLANDS, SEXUAL MORALITY IN ANCIENT ROME (2002).
43
See, e.g., DAVID L. HOFFMANN, STALINIST VALUES: THE CULTURAL NORMS OF
SOVIET MODERNITY 1917-1941, 88–117 (2003).
40
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should apply equally to men and women. Smith treats this
difference between ancient and modern sex-positivity as a mere
detail, 44 but one might just as easily treat it as a primary
variable rooted in a decidedly post-pagan account of our common
human dignity. Finally, it merits some notice that the “culture
war” over sex, as a practical matter, has ended up turning on the
question of same-sex marriage, whose supporters, far from
representing the extreme of modern secular sexual liberation,
were actually engaged in a decidedly “conservative” campaign
(recognized as such by critics to their left45) to extend the benefits
of “traditional” marriage to persons to whom it could not
otherwise, if they were true to themselves, be available.46
C. Religious Liberty
Smith also worries about new challenges to “religious
liberty,” especially as dissenters from the new consensus about
same-sex marriage, abortion, and other practices seek to insulate
themselves from laws that they believe would require them to be
complicit in those expressions of the new “paganism.” The
question here, though, which I have discussed elsewhere,47 is why
admittedly important but relatively conventional disputes over
the proper balance to be struck between religious rights and the
urgent interests of the wider society (as well as the potential
rights of third parties) have been transformed (often by both
sides) into apocalyptic battles in which each side accuses the
other of “weaponizing” legal rights for the sake of prevailing in
the larger war for America’s soul. As with the debate over samesex marriage, to which it has lately been tightly tethered,
genuine complexities and complications get too easily lost if we
too quickly deploy labels such as “Christian” and “pagan” or
resort to the metaphor of “culture wars.”
PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 1, at 286 (“Modern sexual norms run
parallel in important respects to ancient pagan attitudes and practices—except that
these attitudes and practices have been extended to include women as well as
men.”).
45
See MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (1999).
46
See Perry Dane, Natural Law, Equality, and Same-Sex Marriage, 62 BUFF. L.
REV. 291 (2014).
47
See Perry Dane, Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Costs of Weaponization,
BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS, BERKLEY CTR.
RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS: BERKLEY F. (July 2, 2018), https://berkley
center.georgetown.edu/responses/masterpiece-cakeshop-and-the-costs-ofweaponization.
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CONCLUSION: TOGETHER IN THE CITY
My various observations about the argument in Smith’s
Pagans and Christians end up following one from the other to
form a single narrative. To begin with, Smith’s single-minded
focus on the distinction between pagan immanence and Christian
transcendence does not sufficiently acknowledge the deep
interdependence of transcendence and immanence in the
religoius imagination. It also neglects other equally important
distinctions, especially between the transcendent frame that
united ancient pagans, Jews, and Christians and the
immanenent frame in which all of us moderns—Christians, Jews,
and secularists—live. And, by assimilating Jews to Christians
and modern immanent folk to ancient pagans, it elides the
various specific permutations of resemblance and difference
among these various traditions (and others) that render close to
impossible any effort to reduce our complex religious history to
any overarching binary.
In the light of all that, it should not be suprising that the
rise of modernity would provoke complex and even contradictory
reactions even among the religiously-committed. After all,
religious believers are both freer—physically and spiritually—
than they were during the long era of Christendom, and—in the
very exercise of that freedom—less at home in the increasingly
secular world around them. And it should be even less suprising
that many of the legal and social conflicts that animate the
current culture wars should appear, on reflection, both
signficantly harder to adjudicate and in the broader sweep of
history significantly less consequential than they might first
appear.
In sum, as I suggested at the start, my effort here to focus on
some of the ironies and gaps in Smith’s account has sought to
suggest, in various ways, that what might sometimes seem like
dichotomies are often complex interweavings, and what might
seem like spiritual wars are often the profound back-and-forth of
human spiritual history. In the end, part of what I have tried to
bring to these reflections is just a different sensibility. To my
mind, culture wars are a sad distraction from the more promising
path of genuine dialogue.
I am not suggesting simple
compromise, let alone surrender by one side or the other. Nor am
I trying to promote what John Courtney Murray in a different
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context called “bogus irenicism.”48 But it should surely be
possible to see in some of our current cultural, political, and legal
conflicts as not merely “culture wars” but also opportunities for
genuine engagement, mutual learning, and even dialectical
transformation. It might be time to reframe our divisions and
not merely lament them.
In that spirit, I look to Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, the first
Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi in British Mandatory Palestine, who saw
in secular, even atheist, Jews, a spark of spiritual energy often
lacking in his fellow Orthodox Jews.49 I look to Pope Francis,
who affirmed that it is better to be an atheist than a bad
Christian,50 and who might feel the same way even about modern
“pagans.” I look to Sarah Coakley, an Anglican theologian who
articulates a vision of the Christian Trinity grounded in patristic
sources but also takes seriously the implications of “divine
desire” for a vision of human sexuality not beholden to the
categories of “repression” and “libertinism.”51 I look to William
Connolly, a secular thinker who explained why he is not a
“secularist.”52 I look to Terry Eagleton, another secular thinker,
who seeks to challenge theists and atheists alike with the
genuinely radical vision that he finds in the Biblical text and
religious sensibility.53 All of us—Christians, “pagans” of all
descriptions, Jews, and for that matter, Muslims, Hindus,
Buddhists, and the rest—have something to teach each other. It
might be time to put down the pitchforks and start.

48
JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 136 (1960), https://www.library.geo
rgetown.edu/woodstock/murray/whtt_c5_1958e.
49
See YEHUDAH MIRSKY, RAV KOOK: MYSTIC IN A TIME OF REVOLUTION (2014).
50
See Julie Zauzmer, Pope Francis suggests it’s better to be an atheist than a
hypocritical Catholic, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2017/02/23/pope-francis-praises-the-torah-and-sugge
sts-its-better-to-be-an-atheist-than-a-bad-catholic/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.24650
c3824f9.
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(2013).
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